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# Splinters and Schisms: Rebel Group Fragmentation and the Durability of Insurgencies

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## ABSTRACT



Insurgent organizations often experience internal fragmentation when a faction breaks away to form a separate group with independent leadership. Following a split, what factors influence the relative durability and status of groups within larger nationalist movements? Existing theory attributes variation in groups' performance after a division to rebel strategy. Specifically, some work argues that extremist groups using violence will outbid more moderate competitors; however, alternate research contends organizations using strategic non-violence will have more success. Contrary to previous work, this inquiry argues that in many instances rebel strategy following a split has little influence on the duration and status of groups. Instead, organizations' relative membership size at the time of a division is the most important factor influencing their subsequent performance. That is, after a split larger core groups are more likely to survive for longer periods and to advance within their broader nationalist movements than splinter groups. However, in cases when divisions result in groups of similar size and strength, strategy may still play a significant role in rebel organizations' comparative longevity and status.

## KEYWORDS

insurgency; terrorism; fragmentation; splinter; schism; national movements

## Introduction

Insurgent groups often experience internal disagreements.<sup>1</sup> At times these disputes are so severe that a faction breaks away to form a separate organization with independent leadership.<sup>2</sup> For example, in 2010 the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement split from its parent organization, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, due to the larger organization's involvement in peace negotiations with the government of the Philippines. In another instance, the Red Brigades Guerrilla Party (BR-PG) separated from the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy in 1981. In this case, rather than being the more extreme faction, the BR-PG billed itself as a less violent alternative to the BR and sought to win support by presenting communist activists in Italy with a more moderate option.<sup>3</sup> These examples illustrate the widely prevalent phenomenon of fragmentation within insurgent groups, which is estimated to occur in about half of all intrastate conflicts.<sup>4</sup> Academic research on this subject has advanced rapidly in recent years, examining key issues including the causes of divisions within rebel groups and the effect these splits have on levels of violence in insurgencies. Despite increased attention from scholars, several important questions concerning splits within rebel groups remain unexplored. This

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inquiry fills a gap in the existing literature by addressing the following question: What factors influence variation in insurgent organizations' longevity and status within a larger nationalist movement following an internal split?

While scholars have previously examined the reasons that divisions within rebel groups occur, less scrutiny has been given to variation in the durability and status of the organizations that emerge after an internal fragmentation.<sup>5</sup> Researchers investigating this question generally focus on groups' strategies and have arrived at opposing conclusions. Some work implies that insurgent organizations opting for a primarily non-violent strategy will outperform groups using violence—including non-state terrorism<sup>6</sup>—because potential sympathizers are more likely to support organizations that avoid victimizing civilians.<sup>7</sup> Conversely, an alternate branch of research suggests that more extreme groups may “outbid” moderate competitors by using violence to signal their superior resolve and commitment.<sup>8</sup> Contrary to previous findings, this inquiry argues that rebel strategy often has little influence on groups' performance following an internal division. Instead, organizations' relative strength—as measured by membership size—at the time of a split is the most important factor influencing their longevity and standing within a broader nationalist movement.

To test this argument, two types of splits are examined—splinters and schisms. Each of these categories is based on the relative size of the organizations that emerge after a division. Splinters occur when a small faction within a larger core organization breaks away to form a new group. By contrast, schisms take place when an insurgent group divides into two new organizations of similar size. The inquiry's central argument is that the larger group emerging after a splinter will survive for a longer period and have more influence within a country's nationalist movement than the smaller organization. That is, the distribution of members between groups at the time of a splinter has more influence on their subsequent performance than the strategies they adopt. In cases of a schism, however, when the strength of groups after a split is held constant, variation in strategic choice may still play an important role in influencing the durability and status of insurgent organizations.

The remainder of this inquiry proceeds as follows: First, previous literature examining structural and organizational variables associated with insurgent group fragmentation is reviewed. Second, the study's theoretical arguments and research design are presented. In subsequent sections, the theoretical claims advanced in the study are tested on case studies of splits within the Muslim Brotherhood, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and the Basque separatist organization ETA. The final section outlines directions for future research in the field of insurgent group fragmentation and summarizes the study's findings.

## Fragmentation and Levels of Analysis in Insurgencies

An insurgent group is a non-state organization that seeks to gain political control over territory controlled by a sovereign government by using means outside an established legal framework for transferring power. Insurgent groups may employ both violent and non-violent tactics to advance their interests.<sup>9</sup> Intrastate conflicts often involve a host of insurgent groups—collectively referred to as a “nationalist movement”—that may both compete and cooperate while simultaneously challenging a government.<sup>10</sup> For example,

during the early stages of the Salvadoran Civil War in the 1980s, several independent rebel organizations collectively formed the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). This umbrella organization permitted separate groups to coordinate their activities, ultimately helping the FMLN reach a negotiated settlement with the government of El Salvador in 1992.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, in the mid-1980s in Sri Lanka, five Tamil separatist organizations formed a coalition called the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF). However, in this instance, disputes among individual insurgent groups led to the disintegration of the ENLF and subsequent infighting among its former members.<sup>12</sup> In recent years, researchers have increasingly focused on the complex dynamics that exist among the organizations forming larger nationalist movements.<sup>13</sup> A central finding of these investigations is that movements are not “unitary actors.”<sup>14</sup> Instead, as Bakke et al. note, movements consist of a “shifting set of actors who share a central identity but who have malleable allegiances and potentially divergent interests.”<sup>15</sup>

The number of insurgent groups in a nationalist movement, the level of cooperation or conflict between groups, and the distribution of power among organizations, have been characterized by scholars as a movement’s “structural” characteristics.<sup>16</sup> Recent work examining movements’ structural attributes has led to several important findings. Specifically, researchers have determined that the distribution of power across a nationalist movement is often responsible for the strategic choices of individual insurgent groups. For instance, Bakke et al. hypothesize that the existence of a dominant organization within a movement lowers the probability that violent infighting occurs among organizations.<sup>17</sup> That is, movements with a hegemonic organization are less likely to fragment as the result of disputes over strategy and leadership. Using similar reasoning, Krause contends that nationalist movements with a single dominant group are more likely to achieve their objectives than movements made up of several competing groups of comparable strength and influence.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to investigating the structural features of movements, scholars have also identified organizational level factors that cause splits within individual insurgent groups.<sup>19</sup> For example, ideological disputes, geographic separation, ethnic divisions, and economic incentives can all increase the likelihood of internal organizational splits.<sup>20</sup> Often, however, divisions within groups are triggered by disagreements over strategy that occur between a faction seeking to use violence and a faction seeking to employ more moderate tactics.<sup>21</sup> In addition to causing internal splits, strategic disputes within organizations can have a significant influence on subsequent patterns of violence. For instance, after a division occurs, levels of terrorism may rise as a more extreme group uses attacks to spoil negotiations or to appear more committed to achieving its objectives than a moderate competitor.<sup>22</sup>

While academic work on splits within rebel organizations has made significant progress, important aspects of insurgent group fragmentation remain overlooked. One question researchers have yet to explore fully concerns the relative performance of groups that emerge after an internal organizational fissure. Existing theory on insurgencies only indirectly assesses this question and has focused primarily on the role of rebel strategy. One branch of research argues that after a split occurs more extreme groups can use violence to outbid their less extreme rivals. For instance, Kydd and Walter contend that when sympathizers of competing insurgent groups are unsure about where to direct their support, they may be more likely to back the organization that appears more committed to

achieving its objectives. Rebel violence—often taking the form of terrorist attacks against civilian non-combatants—is a means to signal an organization’s commitment and resolve to potential supporters.<sup>23</sup> Thus, Kydd and Walter argue that sympathizers of a nationalist movement are more likely to direct their support towards violent, hardline groups that appear deeply committed to reaching their goals. In contrast, an alternate argument suggests that rebel organizations that primarily use non-violent tactics—including protests, strikes, civil disobedience, foreign diplomacy, and propaganda—will draw increased material support from both the domestic population and foreign countries, and will thus eventually have a higher probability of defeating a government. Stephan and Chenoweth, for instance, claim that a non-violent approach to rebellion encourages broad-based domestic support and an increased likelihood of foreign assistance that rarely materializes for violent insurgent groups.<sup>24</sup> Despite the existence of these two competing theories, researchers have yet to reach consensus regarding what accounts for variation in the longevity and status of rebel groups after an internal split. To address this gap in the literature, the following sections present and test a theory explaining variation in groups’ relative performance after a division has occurred.

## Theory and Research Method

This section advances a theory explaining insurgent groups’ relative durability and change in status within a nationalist movement following an internal split. Two ideal-type classes of within-group division are examined: splinters and schisms. These two categories constitute the inquiry’s explanatory variables and are based on the relative size of organizations that emerge after a split. Splinter groups arise when a faction of no more than one-third of the larger core organization breaks away to form a new group.<sup>25</sup> For instance, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) has experienced numerous splinters during its existence, resulting in the creation of significantly smaller groups including Palestinian Popular Struggle (PPSF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC); and the Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PRFLP). Conversely, schisms occur when an insurgent group divides into two organizations of similar membership size. For example, in the mid-1980s the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) officially split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in a dispute over the role that Islam would play in the separatist movement on the Philippine island of Mindanao. As part of this division, the MILF took a significant portion of the MNLF’s membership and was therefore on nearly equal footing with the MNLF shortly after the split.

This inquiry’s central argument is that the type of division that occurs will influence groups’ subsequent longevity and standing within a nationalist movement. Specifically, when a splinter occurs, the larger core organization will last for a longer period and will have a more prominent position within the country’s broader movement than the smaller group. Membership size at the time of a splinter works through at least two distinct causal mechanisms to extend the lifespan and advance the status of core groups relative to splinter groups.<sup>26</sup> First, core organizations are better prepared to withstand government attacks on their members and supporters. Simply put, splinter groups’ relatively small size makes them more likely to be weakened by government counterinsurgency operations. Ultimately, detentions and casualties inflicted by a government are likely to take a greater

toll on splinter groups, causing them to decrease in size and lose the confidence of other actors within their movement. Second, core organizations often use their superior military strength to attack splinter groups perceived to be challengers for recruits and resources.<sup>27</sup> In these cases, splinter groups' relative weakness compared to core organizations makes it likely they will suffer casualties and defections. Splinter groups under attack by core organizations will struggle to recruit new members and are therefore likely to remain peripheral actors within their nationalist movements.

While relative membership size is the primary factor affecting the performance of groups emerging after a splinter, in cases of a schism—in which a division results in organizations of similar size—strategy may play an important role in the longevity and status of rebel organizations. That is, because groups emerging from a schism have comparable levels of strength, this factor alone cannot account for differences in their performance.<sup>28</sup> Following a schism, the effect of strategy is likely to be greater in cases in which groups adopt markedly different approaches, such as non-violence or terrorism, than in cases where they adopt similar but not identical strategies, such as varying levels of terrorism or mixed strategies such as the simultaneous use of both terrorism and guerrilla warfare.<sup>29</sup> Previous research has identified two unique causal processes linking strategy to the performance of rebel organizations. First, when organizations outbid their rivals, they secure material support and increase recruitment by demonstrating superior commitment to movement objectives. Therefore, through signaling superior resolve, rebel groups may persist for longer periods and advance within movements. Second, groups adopting a primarily non-violent strategy expect to attract resources and increase membership by appealing to a broad base of the population. This increased support will permit groups to endure and to advance within their movement.

### ***Measurement of Division Types and Post-fragmentation Group Performance***

This study's independent variables consist of two types of rebel group divisions, each based on the sizes of the organizations that emerge after a split.<sup>30</sup> A splinter occurs when a faction of no more than one-third of the core insurgent organization breaks away to form a separate group. Conversely, schisms take place when a division results in a new group with more than a third of the original organization's members. These two classes of divisions are ideal-type characterizations. In reality, every rebel group split is distinct and possesses features that distinguish it from other cases. The purpose of creating an ideal-type categorization, however, is to permit an initial assessment of the role that relative membership size has on the durability and status of rebel groups following a divide. Additionally, this binary independent variable is used because information about the exact sizes of insurgent organizations is often difficult to verify. That is, while it is possible to make general estimates about groups' membership, data on the precise size of organizations after a split is often not accessible. In the future, if additional data becomes available, a more precise ordinal or numerical scale of division types can be developed to further differentiate categories of internal rebel group division.<sup>31</sup>

The inquiry's dependent variable measures the lifespan of groups after a split and the level of influence groups have within larger nationalist movements. The duration of insurgencies is often used as a proxy for the overall performance of groups.<sup>32</sup> However, tracking groups' longevity alone does not provide a complete picture of their performance.

That is, because insurgencies are often extended low-intensity conflicts, groups can exist for considerable periods while not making significant progress.<sup>33</sup> For this reason, an additional indicator of performance—the status of a rebel organization within its nationalist movement—is measured by determining whether groups advance within a movement by acting as a representative in negotiations with a government, achieving success in elections, or by increasing their membership size.<sup>34</sup> Together, rebel organizations' durability and their status within a movement provide a more complete picture of group performance than either indicator alone.

### ***Case Selection and Scope of Theory***

Presently, there is no comprehensive dataset tracking splits within insurgent groups. Because of this limitation, case studies are used to test the inquiry's primary argument: namely that the distribution of members between groups at the time of a splinter is the major factor influencing their subsequent longevity and status.<sup>35</sup> This argument is evaluated alongside two rival theories that stress the role of rebel strategy on groups' post-split performance. The first alternative argument claims that insurgents using a violent strategy of outbidding will achieve superior outcomes. The second theory contends that rebel organizations using strategic non-violence will outperform groups using violence.

To assess alternate claims alongside the theory advanced in this study, most-likely cases for competing explanations were chosen. Most-likely cases are instances in which a theory predicts an outcome with a high level of certainty. If the expected outcome does not emerge in a most-likely case, a theory's validity is significantly reduced.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, if a different theory can better explain an outcome in a most-likely case, that theory's explanatory scope is increased. Applying this logic to this inquiry, if larger core groups regularly survive for longer periods and advance into positions of leadership within movements, then the study's central claims will be strengthened. However, if groups pursuing a particular strategic approach—whether violent or non-violent—consistently have longer lifespans and improve their standing within movements, then the inquiry's central argument will be weakened.

The argument that violent splinter factions successfully outbid more moderate rivals is tested against the inquiry's claims about relative group size by examining the split of Al-Gama'a al Islamiyya (IG) from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This splinter represents a most-likely case for the outbidding hypothesis due to the high levels of violence IG pursued to win popular support away from the more moderate Brotherhood. In this instance, if IG's terrorist campaign helped it improve its standing within the Islamist movement in Egypt, the outbidding thesis will be supported; however, if relative membership size at the time of the splinter better explains the varying performance of IG and the Brotherhood, then the inquiry's central hypothesis will be strengthened.

Conversely, the claim that primarily non-violent organizations outperform violent groups after a splinter is assessed by examining the separation of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. The PLOTE's largely peaceful approach to rebellion represents a most-likely case for the argument that non-violent organizations are superior at developing successful mass movements than their more extreme rivals. In this instance, if PLOTE expanded its membership and assumed a leadership position within the Tamil nationalist movement, it

would serve as evidence supporting the efficacy of strategic non-violence. Conversely, if the relative size of the organizations at the time of the splinter better explains the varying trajectories of the PLOTE and the LTTE, then theory emphasizing membership size will be supported.

In addition to examining splinters, this inquiry assesses a schism—a case in which a division within an insurgent group results in two organizations of similar size. This type of split is examined to demonstrate the influence of strategy on relative group performance under certain conditions. When schisms occur, the independent variable of organizational capacity does not meaningfully vary across groups and therefore cannot account for the subsequent performance of rebel organizations. In these cases, strategy is more likely to play an important factor in the durability of rival organizations than in splinters. The split within the Basque insurgent organization *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) that resulted in the formation of *ETA-militar* (ETA-m) and *ETA-politico militar* (ETA-pm) is assessed to determine how strategy can influence the longevity and status of groups following a schism. This case was selected because the post-schism groups chose to pursue distinctly different approaches, with ETA-m implementing an aggressive terrorist campaign while ETA-pm attempted to create a separatist mass movement through primarily non-violent tactics.

Finally, the scope of this study is limited to comparing the relative performance of insurgent groups after an internal split occurs. Unlike previous research, which largely examines interactions among organizations within a nationalist movement or the causes of rebel group divisions, this inquiry assesses the relative performance of organizations that emerge following a binary split. Analyzing groups that arise after an internal division is useful because it is a form of controlled comparison in which many factors potentially influencing the relative longevity and status of rebel organizations are held constant.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, this inquiry evaluates insurgent groups and not legal political parties or oppositional organizations that seek objectives less extreme than separatism or regime change. Finally, this inquiry does not examine whether groups achieve their long-term objectives. While identifying factors associated with the overall outcome of insurgencies is important, that question has been addressed in previous work.<sup>38</sup>

## Splinter Divisions

This section considers two instances of splintering. The first case examines a division that occurred within the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, a primarily non-violent organization dedicated to the creation of an Islamist government. This splinter resulted in the formation of IG, a group that used terrorism in an effort to overthrow the government of Egypt and replace it with an Islamist regime. The second case study examines a splinter that occurred during the early years of the civil war in Sri Lanka. In this case, the PLOTE broke away from the LTTE due to the LTTE's commitment to violence and the PLOTE's decision to advance the cause of Tamil separatism by using primarily non-violent resistance. Across these two cases, the strategy of core organizations and splinter groups varies. However, regardless of the approach used by groups, the stronger organization at the time of the splinter persists for a longer period and is more prominent in its nationalist movement than the splinter group. While the core group outlasts and outperforms the splinter, the causal process by which this takes place is distinct in each case. In Egypt, the Brotherhood's size allowed the group to withstand the crackdown on the Islamist



movement in Egypt in the 1990s that severely weakened IG. The Brotherhood emerged from this period of repression poised to take advantage of anti-regime sentiment that had arisen against the government of Hosni Mubarak. Meanwhile, in Sri Lanka the LTTE used its superior size and military strength to intimidate PLOTE supporters and members, ultimately resulting in the PLOTE's abandonment of its insurgency. By destroying the PLOTE and other competitor groups, the LTTE became the focal organization for supporters of Tamil independence.

### ***The Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya***

The Muslim Brotherhood formed in Egypt in 1928 and was initially dedicated to implementing broad social reform according to traditional Islamic principles.<sup>39</sup> Rather than pursuing a militant strategy, the Brotherhood spent its early years building popular support through the development of social, charitable, and religious institutions.<sup>40</sup> These organizations enabled the group to spread its central messages of political Islamism<sup>41</sup>—often referred to as *din wa dawla*—and adherence to traditional cultural practices to a large cross-section of Egypt's population.<sup>42</sup> The group's gradualist approach to social revolution was extremely successful, and by the mid 1940s the Brotherhood was estimated to have over 300,000 members.<sup>43</sup>

Characterization of the Brotherhood as an insurgent organization during the early decades of its existence is problematic. The group's primary objectives during this period were social reform and creation of a robust organizational infrastructure, with the long-term goal of establishing an Islamist government through a gradual political transition.<sup>44</sup> However, in 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser, head of the revolutionary government that seized power through a coup in 1952, outlawed the Brotherhood and began a campaign of repression against its members.<sup>45</sup> After this, the group became dedicated to the overthrow of the Egyptian government, although there were numerous subsequent internal debates about the strategy the Brotherhood should pursue to achieve this objective.<sup>46</sup> More moderate members of the organization believed that violent confrontation with the state was impractical, citing the group's decline as a result of Nasser's crackdown. Instead, they called for the Brotherhood to continue forward with a gradualist, non-violent approach to social revolution.<sup>47</sup> Conversely, state persecution of the Brotherhood led to the emergence of a more extreme ideology, reflected most prominently in the works of Sayyid Qutb, that called for active engagement in bringing about the end of secular governance in Egypt.<sup>48</sup> These divergent approaches to rebellion would persist within the Brotherhood through the 1960s and 1970s, even after Anwar Sadat came to power and granted amnesty to many of the group's imprisoned members.<sup>49</sup>

In the mid 1970s, a radical faction within the Brotherhood split off and formed IG, a separate group with an independent leadership structure.<sup>50</sup> Like the Brotherhood, IG believed that Egypt should be governed by Islamic law; however, IG leaders argued that resistance to the Egyptian government must take a more militant turn to be successful.<sup>51</sup> As DeGregorio notes, IG's goal was to destabilize Egypt by using violence to mobilize support among poor youth in Upper Egypt, Minya, and Assiut, with the ultimate goal of creating a new government.<sup>52</sup> In effect, the group sought to outbid the Brotherhood by providing a more extreme outlet for segments of the population who supported Islamism and opposed Egypt's secular government.<sup>53</sup> Using intimidation to enforce Islamic law and

rally extremists, IG built a base of support in neighborhoods and at universities in Upper Egypt and by the early 1980s was estimated to have several thousand members; however, the group did not come close to approaching the size of the Brotherhood, which had hundreds of thousands of members.<sup>54</sup>

Following Sadat's assassination, President Hosni Mubarak for several years adopted a "permissive" approach to both IG and the Brotherhood.<sup>55</sup> However, as IG expanded into Cairo in the early 1990s, Egyptian state security forces began operations against the group. In response, IG began an intensified terrorist campaign intended to delegitimize the Mubarak regime and draw increased support from radicalized segments of the population.<sup>56</sup> From 1990–1998, IG carried out over two-hundred fifty terrorist incidents in Egypt resulting in four-hundred ninety-two deaths.<sup>57</sup> Meanwhile, although the government increased levels of repression on all Islamist groups, the Brotherhood refrained from using terrorism and instead decided to persist with its longstanding commitment to non-violence.<sup>58</sup>

IG's effort to outbid the Brotherhood in the 1990s was largely unsuccessful. After terrorist attacks escalated, the Mubarak regime initiated an aggressive wave of arrests, interrogations, detentions, and executions of suspected extremists.<sup>59</sup> These actions—along with new anti-terrorism laws and prosecution of IG members in public military tribunals—severely weakened the organization. A significant portion of IG's leadership was killed or captured and other high-ranking members fled the country.<sup>60</sup> While imprisoned, IG's remaining leadership came to the conclusion that the organization could neither defeat the state militarily nor instigate a widespread revolution by attacking civilians.<sup>61</sup> By 2001, IG agreed to renounce violence and its leaders publicly altered their stance on the religious legitimacy of a militant holy war in Egypt.<sup>62</sup> Many of the group's leaders were subsequently released from prison and IG attempted to reassert itself in its traditional strongholds. However, by 2005 the group's membership had shrunk to fewer than 500 individuals, and many Islamist sympathizers within the general population who had previously supported IG shifted their allegiance to the Brotherhood.<sup>63</sup> Thus, while IG has not ceased to exist as an organization, it did not form a part of the revolutionary movement that ousted Mubarak from power in 2011, and has been marginalized as an actor in the Egyptian Islamist movement for well over a decade.

While IG's organizational capacity was disrupted by the government's repression, the Brotherhood's size and institutional cohesion allowed it to withstand the increased pressure placed on Islamists by the Mubarak regime. Although the Brotherhood did not carry out violent attacks, the Egyptian government viewed the campaign against IG as an opportunity to weaken all Islamist organizations, including the Brotherhood, which had made considerable political gains during Mubarak's early rule. For instance, in 1995 eighty-one high-ranking members of the Brotherhood were arrested and brought before military courts as part of public trials intended to discredit the group.<sup>64</sup> Subsequent mass arrests of Brotherhood members occurred at universities and within unions. The purpose of these detentions was to halt the organization's expanding political and social influence by incarcerating its leading figures and to deter sympathizers from supporting the organization.<sup>65</sup> However, while IG was debilitated by similar government tactics, the Brotherhood's size enabled it to withstand the Mubarak regime's crackdown. Although the Brotherhood was forced to move some of its activities underground during the 1990s, the group emerged from a decade of harsh government repression as Egypt's most

influential opposition force.<sup>66</sup> In the following decade, the Brotherhood would use its increased political profile to spur a broader movement demanding the ouster of Mubarak.

In summary, while both IG and the Muslim Brotherhood sought the creation of a state governed by Islamic law, each group used a different strategy to achieve this objective. By providing a more extreme outlet for Islamist sympathizers, IG hoped to outbid the Brotherhood, which steadfastly held to its long-running strategy of non-violence. When the splinter occurred, the Brotherhood remained the far larger organization with hundreds of thousands of members firmly embedded in religious and social institutions across Egypt. In the early 1990s, IG embarked on a violent terrorist campaign intended to ignite a wider revolution. IG's attacks caused the Mubarak regime to respond with a campaign of repression against all Egyptian Islamist groups including the Brotherhood, which it publicly sought to associate with IG's extremist tactics. The state's crackdown resulted in the capture, exile, or death of key IG leaders, which appreciably weakened the group. By contrast, the large size and broad social support enjoyed by the Brotherhood at the time of the crackdown allowed the organization to withstand Mubarak's repression even though hundreds of its members were imprisoned. Following a decade of state repression, IG was in decline. Its relatively small size compared to the Brotherhood made it unable to withstand government arrests, incarcerations, and executions. Conversely, following the repression of the 1990s the Brotherhood emerged as the dominant opposition force to the Mubarak regime and played an influential role in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

### ***The LTTE and the PLOTE***

Splinters often occur when a violent faction breaks away from a larger, non-violent insurgent organization; however, cases also exist when factions that favor using primarily non-violent tactics split from more extreme core groups.<sup>67</sup> An example of this type of splinter occurred during the early years of the Sri Lankan Civil War when the PLOTE separated from the more violent LTTE over disputes about strategy. In this case, the LTTE's superior size and military capabilities following the splinter enabled the group to intimidate PLOTE supporters and potential recruits. The LTTE's attacks on PLOTE members eventually caused the smaller organization to deteriorate, ultimately resulting in the PLOTE abandoning its goal of separatism.

The origins of the civil war in Sri Lanka can be traced to ethnic tensions between the island's majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil populations.<sup>68</sup> Sri Lanka gained independence from Great Britain in 1948. In the decades following independence, the Sinhalese majority used its increasingly dominant position in government to marginalize the country's smaller Tamil population. For example, in 1956 the government approved the Sinhalese Only Language Act making Sinhalese the country's official language. Tamils were also angered by post-independence government-sponsored resettlement plans, which moved over 165,000 Sinhalese to areas of the country predominantly populated by Tamils.<sup>69</sup> In 1972, Sri Lanka's constitution was amended to make Buddhism—the faith practiced by most Sinhalese—the official state religion.<sup>70</sup> The amended constitution also established quotas limiting the number of Tamils who could enroll in medical, engineering, and science programs at universities. Collectively, these actions were viewed by Tamils as an effort to systematically exclude them from government positions and prestigious professional occupations.

In the mid-1970s, numerous separatist insurgent groups formed in Northern Sri Lanka as outlets for widespread Tamil dissatisfaction with the ruling Sinhalese government. Among these organizations was the LTTE, which was founded in 1973 by Vellupillai Prabhakaran and from its inception was committed to using violence to achieve an independent Tamil state.<sup>71</sup> From 1977–1983, the LTTE was responsible for ninety deaths due to terrorist and guerrilla attacks.<sup>72</sup> The group's extremism brought it attention and support from many disaffected young Tamils and, by the early 1980s, the LTTE had built a robust base of support in the northern regional capital of Jaffna.<sup>73</sup>

The LTTE's violence had detractors, however, who viewed the organization's strategy as excessively brutal. In 1980, internal debates over the role of violence resulted in a splinter within the group. A high-ranking member of the LTTE, Uma Masheswaran, left the organization and formed the PLOTE, a new organization that favored a primarily non-violent strategy of grassroots mobilization to advance the cause of a Tamil state. The PLOTE did not completely eschew the development of military capacity in its early years; however, its central focus was fostering a broad-based Tamil nationalist movement that stressed socialist economic principles.<sup>74</sup> Despite the loss of some members to the PLOTE, the LTTE was only marginally affected by the splinter.<sup>75</sup> The LTTE retained many committed soldiers who had received specialized military training, thus providing the group with significantly more military capacity than the PLOTE.<sup>76</sup> During the early 1980s, estimates are that the LTTE had up to 10,000 members, while the PLOTE had up to 2,500.<sup>77</sup>

Immediately following the splinter, tensions between the LTTE and the PLOTE were muted. Because both groups simultaneously received material support from India's foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the organizations did not need to compete with one another for resources.<sup>78</sup> In addition to receiving foreign assistance, however, the LTTE diversified its sources of funding and weapons so that it would not become totally dependent on Indian backing. The LTTE's caution was well warranted; by the mid-1980s Indian assistance for Tamil rebels diminished, and Tamil insurgent organizations were forced to find new sources of support.

Competition for resources caused the LTTE to view the PLOTE as a strategic challenger that could siphon away recruits and funding. To neutralize this threat, the LTTE used its superior strength and military capacity to intimidate PLOTE sympathizers and, at times, to kill PLOTE members.<sup>79</sup> By attacking the PLOTE, the LTTE sought to ensure that limited resources available to the Tamil separatist movement did not go to a more moderate competitor. Furthermore, the LTTE hoped to recruit some PLOTE members for its cause. To that end, in 1986 the LTTE issued public statements banning all PLOTE activities and demanding that PLOTE members join the LTTE. In some instances, the LTTE would accept defectors into its ranks. However, on other occasions the LTTE massacred former PLOTE cadres.<sup>80</sup> The LTTE's attacks significantly weakened the splinter group, and by the late 1980s the PLOTE ceased to function as an insurgent organization, renouncing its call for a separate Tamil state.<sup>81</sup> Conversely, the ranks of the LTTE swelled as the PLOTE and other smaller insurgent groups folded or abandoned the creation of a Tamil state. As the LTTE consolidated power, supporters of Tamil independence had few other outlets for resistance and the LTTE thus emerged from the 1980s as the leader of the Tamil separatist cause.<sup>82</sup> The group would go on to survive until 2009 when it was ultimately destroyed by the Sri Lankan government.

To summarize, the LTTE's longer lifespan and more prominent position in the Tamil separatist movement than the PLOTE can largely be explained by the LTTE's superior size and military capacity. Following the splinter, the LTTE employed a campaign of brutal intra-ethnic violence to debilitate its competitor.<sup>83</sup> Ultimately, the LTTE's attacks caused widespread defections within the PLOTE while also deterring PLOTE sympathizers from providing the group material support.<sup>84</sup> The PLOTE was neither large enough nor did it possess the requisite military capacity to withstand the LTTE's onslaught and so was forced to give up its struggle against the Sri Lankan government altogether.<sup>85</sup> By the late 1980s, the LTTE's attacks had decimated the PLOTE, while the LTTE had emerged as the dominant actor in the Tamil nationalist movement.<sup>86</sup>

## Schisms and Rebel Strategy

Unlike splinters—cases in which a small faction breaks away from a larger core insurgent organization—schisms take place when an internal division results in the emergence of two independent groups of roughly equal size. Because groups' size is comparable, this factor alone cannot explain variation in their subsequent durability and status within a movement. Instead, when schisms occur, insurgent strategy is likely to play a more influential role in groups' relative performance than in splinters. To assess the effect of rebel strategy after a schism, this section examines the split within the Basque insurgent group ETA that led to the creation of ETA-m and ETA-pm. The ETA division is an excellent case to examine schisms for two reasons. First, both groups used distinct strategies after the split: ETA-m adopted an aggressive terrorist campaign while ETA-pm chose to prioritize mass mobilization. Second, schisms often occur because a faction within an insurgent organization disagrees about the long-term objectives of the group. In these cases, schisms take place not because organizations disagree about strategy, but rather because one faction seeks a more extreme objective—such as regime change—while a more moderate faction seeks, for example, only regional autonomy. In these cases, comparing the performance of groups after a schism is problematic because their objectives differ. However, after the ETA schism, both ETA-m and ETA-pm continued to pursue the goal of Basque independence.

### *The ETA Schism*

ETA was formed in 1959 as a separatist organization committed to obtaining Basque independence from the regime of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco. By demanding an independent state, ETA distinguished itself from the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which by the late 1950s sought only limited autonomy for the Basque region.<sup>87</sup> From 1959 to 1967, ETA largely refrained from using violence; however, in 1968 the group embarked on a new strategy known as the “action repression spiral,” a plan intended to provoke increased repression from the Franco regime by carrying out targeted attacks against government security forces and sympathizers. Between 1968–1975, ETA killed forty-four individuals, most of them civilians with ties to the Franco government.<sup>88</sup> To ETA's dismay, the Basque people—while aggrieved by the dictatorship's increased repression—were dissuaded from supporting the insurgency out of fear of imprisonment and torture.<sup>89</sup> ETA had believed state repression would be the catalyst for a nationalist revolution;

instead, the Franco regime's crackdown nearly destroyed the organization.<sup>90</sup> Nonetheless, the publicity ETA received as a result of its militant campaign coupled with the political uncertainty caused by Franco's death in 1975 enabled the group to survive as a relevant political actor after the end of the dictatorship.

Within three years of Franco's death, a new Spanish constitution was approved and free elections were held. Around this time, ETA became internally divided over how to respond to the emergence of a government willing to grant significant autonomy to the Basque region.<sup>91</sup> One faction, which would later become ETA-pm, argued that the group should move away from its strategy of armed struggle and adopt a primarily non-violent approach aimed at mobilizing a broad cross-section of Basque society. Another faction, which would develop into ETA-m, believed that the transition following Franco's death represented an ideal time to increase the scope of the group's violent campaign and put pressure on the new Spanish government to grant independence to the Basque region. This rift eventually led to a schism within ETA and the subsequent creation of two independent organizations with similar membership sizes.<sup>92</sup>

Following the schism, ETA-pm decided to deemphasize armed struggle with the eventual goal of renouncing violence and becoming a political organization dedicated to attaining Basque independence.<sup>93</sup> As Llera et al. note, after the schism: "ETA-pm became increasingly committed to participation in the post-Franco Spain democratic process."<sup>94</sup> To this end, ETA-pm shifted its focus from conducting armed operations to developing a "mass organization" by seeking the support of Basque workers, students, and intellectuals.<sup>95</sup> In an effort to make ETA-pm a leader within the broader Basque nationalist movement, the group helped create The Party for the Basque Revolution (EIA), and allied itself with a larger coalition of parties and organizations known as the "Basque Left" (EE). ETA-pm also created popular student organizations—including The Movement of the Patriotic Students—to mobilize Basque youth in support of an independent state.<sup>96</sup>

In addition to its focus on mass mobilization, ETA-pm entered into ceasefires with the government of Spain in order to conduct negotiations. Between 1978–1980, rounds of talks with Adolfo Suárez's Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) government led to amnesty for several Basque political prisoners; however, ETA-pm was incapable of extracting additional meaningful concessions. Most notably, the organization was unable to secure the complete withdrawal of federal law enforcement officials from the Basque region.<sup>97</sup> In February 1981, a new ceasefire agreement between ETA-pm and the UCD government, now led by Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, was approved. During ensuing negotiations, ETA-pm and its political proxies, EIA and EE, attempted to raise the issue of independence; however, the government was unwilling to consider the possibility of a referendum on Basque self-determination.<sup>98</sup> Ultimately, stagnation in the negotiation process and the group's inability to achieve any significant gains other than prisoner releases led to internal discord among ETA-pm's members.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, other actors in the Basque separatist movement perceived ETA-pm's approach towards the government of Spain as conciliatory. This caused the group's status among committed Basque separatists to suffer. Faced with a lack of tangible accomplishments and marginalization within the broader movement, ETA-pm ultimately disbanded in the summer of 1982. Some ETA-pm members returned to ETA-m, but many others opted to end their struggle entirely.<sup>100</sup>

In contrast to ETA-pm, ETA-m pursued an aggressive terrorist campaign after the schism.<sup>101</sup> Between 1976–1982, ETA-m was responsible for carrying out six-hundred

eighty-eight violent incidents.<sup>102</sup> Over 60% of these were terrorist attacks targeting businesses, private citizens, private property, and government officials who did not occupy positions in Spain's security forces.<sup>103</sup> Ultimately, ETA-m's campaign did not cause the government to submit to its demands; however, the group did advance organizational objectives through its increased militancy. First, by 1982 ETA-m had grown to over 1,000 members from under 300 in 1976.<sup>104</sup> ETA-m thus experienced rapid membership growth while it conducted its most aggressive terrorist campaign.<sup>105</sup> Second, ETA-m's political proxy, *Herri Batasuna* (HB), achieved success during this period by becoming the second most supported political party in the Basque region as measured by seats in regional parliament.<sup>106</sup> Finally, by the mid-1980s, ETA-m had become a leading organization within the broader Basque separatist movement, which was composed of dozens of different political and social organizations. While ETA-pm's strategy of negotiation and integration into the existing political system was viewed by other separatist groups as a form of collaboration with the Spanish government, ETA-m's violent campaign and unwillingness to compromise resulted in increased support from hardline proponents of Basque self-determination and thus enabled ETA-m to carve out a niche of dedicated support.<sup>107</sup>

In summary, shortly before Franco's death, ETA underwent a schism over what approach to pursue to achieve independence for the Basque region. After the division, ETA-pm sought to use mass mobilization and negotiations with the government to further the cause of Basque separatism. In contrast, ETA-m augmented the scale of its militant campaign in an effort to coerce the transitional Spanish government into granting independence to the Basque region. Ultimately, neither organization achieved its long-term objective; however, the varying strategies of ETA-m and ETA-pm resulted in starkly divergent paths for each group. ETA-pm's choice to pursue a more moderate strategy led to a perception among ardent supporters of Basque separatism that the group was not truly committed to achieving independence. For this reason, the organization's status within the Basque separatist movement declined and, in 1982, ETA-pm disbanded. Conversely, ETA-m's militant campaign vaulted the organization into a leading role within the Basque independence movement and enabled the group to persist until 2017, when it finally laid down its arms. Thus, ETA-m's growth and increased popular support following the schism can be viewed as an example of successful outbidding, in which an extremist faction uses violence to convince potential sympathizers that it is more committed to the movement's objectives than a more moderate competitor.

## Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

Nationalist movements and individual insurgent organizations have fluid, changing compositions. In recent years, this field of research has seen increased work on both fragmentation across movements and splits within rebel organizations. This inquiry has examined an important and overlooked subject within this emerging research paradigm: namely, it has identified factors that account for variation in the relative performance of insurgent groups after an internal division. The study's central argument is that organizations' relative membership size following a splinter is the most important factor influencing their subsequent durability and status within a nationalist movement.

Two causal mechanisms link groups' size to their relative performance after a splinter. The first occurs when governments carry out aggressive counterinsurgency operations against rebel groups. In these cases, the larger core organization is more likely to withstand government attacks than the splinter group, whose small size will make it more susceptible to collapse if its members and supporters are captured or killed. This process was examined in the Egyptian government's campaign against the country's Islamist movement in the 1990s. While IG was severely weakened by the Mubarak regime's repression, the Muslim Brotherhood's size and organizational cohesion allowed it to survive the effects of government security operations and imprisonment of key leaders. The second mechanism examined in this inquiry involves cases when core organizations use their superior size and military capacity to destroy rival splinter groups. This process was evaluated in the PLOTE's separation from the LTTE. In that case, the LTTE used its greater size and strength to intimidate PLOTE supporters and members. The LTTE's campaign severely weakened the PLOTE, resulting in the group abandoning its goal of a Tamil state.

While groups' size at the time of a splinter is the most important factor influencing their relative performance, in cases of a schism, rebel strategy can play an important factor in organizations' durability and status. To demonstrate the scope conditions under which strategy matters, this inquiry examined the schism that occurred within the Basque insurgent organization ETA. In that case, ETA-m successfully used terrorism to outbid its more moderate competitor ETA-pm. The ETA schism thus lends support to the argument that outbidding can be an effective strategic option under certain conditions.

In conclusion, evidence presented in the inquiry supports the argument that the type of split that occurs within an insurgent organization has a significant impact on groups' subsequent longevity and status; however, additional research is necessary to confirm these findings. That is, since case study research was used to test the inquiry's central argument, additional data on splits within rebel groups should be gathered and analyzed to see if assertions made in this study apply to the wider population of post-fragmentation rebel groups.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, while this inquiry has identified two causal mechanisms linking membership size to variation in groups' subsequent performance, it is likely that several additional processes exist that connect groups' size at the time of a splinter to their durability and status.<sup>109</sup> Examination of additional cases is necessary to identify these processes. Finally, in addition to collecting further data on insurgent group divisions, future research should be conducted to determine what effect strategy—including non-state terrorism—has on the longevity and status of insurgent groups following a schism. Evidence presented in this investigation supports the argument that violence carried out by a more extreme faction can help that group outbid more moderate competitors. However, more work is necessary to determine under what conditions outbidding works to advance groups' interests.

## Notes

1. An insurgent group is a non-state organization seeking to control territory and depose a government through extra-legal means, which may or may not include violence. See Michael Findley and Joseph K. Young, "Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize an Insurgency," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 4 (2007): 378–401; Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth,



- “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-Violent Conflict,” *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 7–44.
2. Michael Findley and Peter Rudloff, “Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars,” *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 4 (2012): 879–901; Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2012): 265–83.
  3. While the BR-PG sought to deemphasize the role of militancy in its insurgent campaign, it did not completely refrain from using violence.
  4. Findley and Rudloff (see note 2), 879–901.
  5. Peter Krause, “The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness,” *International Security* 38, no. 3 (2013/2014): 72–116.
  6. Terrorism is defined as violence, or the threat of violence, targeting civilians for the purposes of achieving a political or social objective by influencing audiences. See Todd Sandler, “The Analytic Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 22 (2014): 257–71; Jeff Goodwin, “A Theory of Categorical Terrorism,” *Social Forces* 84 no. 4 (2006): 2027–46.
  7. Stephan and Chenoweth (see note 1), 7–44.
  8. Joseph Young and Laura Dugan, “Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 8, no. 2 (2014): 2–23; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” *International Security* 31, no. 1 (2006): 49–80; Mia Bloom, “Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61–88.
  9. Findley and Young (see note 1); Stephan and Chenoweth (see note 1).
  10. Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 2 (2012): 243–64; Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Kristin M. Bakke, and Lee J. M. Seymour, “Shirts Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-Determination Disputes,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 67–93.
  11. Cynthia McClintock, *Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).
  12. Joanne Richards, *An Institutional History of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (Geneva, Switzerland: CCDP, 2014), 14–15.
  13. Staniland (see note 10), 243–64.
  14. Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour (see note 10), 67–93.
  15. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour (see note 2), 266.
  16. Krause (see note 5), 75–78.
  17. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour (see note 2), 273–5.
  18. Krause (see note 5), 72–116.
  19. Hanne Fjelde and Desirée Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 4 (2012): 604–28.
  20. Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnopolitical Organizations in the Middle East,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 1 (2012): 94–117.
  21. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” *International Organization* 56, no. 2 (2002): 263–96.
  22. Desirée Nilsson and Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs, “Revisiting an Elusive Concept: A Review of the Debate on Spoilers in Peace Processes,” *International Studies Review* 13, no. 4 (2011): 606–26.
  23. Kydd and Walter (see note 8), 76–78.
  24. Stephan and Chenoweth (see note 1), 7–44.
  25. Krause (see note 5) has previously used the ratio of one-third of a larger group’s membership size to identify a smaller group’s potential for challenging the larger group.
  26. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004). George and Bennett refer to the existence

- of multiple causal mechanisms linking independent variables to outcomes across cases as “equifinality.”
27. Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour (see note 2), 265–83.
  28. Not all splits will result in cases in which groups adopt different strategies.
  29. Terrorism targets civilians while guerrilla warfare targets a government’s armed forces. See David B. Carter, “Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks,” *International Organization* 70, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 133–73.
  30. Membership size is often used as a proxy for rebel group strength. See Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 95–96.
  31. James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” *American Journal of Sociology* 104, no. 4 (1999): 1154–96.
  32. Karl R. DeRouen and David Sobek, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 303–20; Young and Dugan (see note 8), 2–23.
  33. For more on the slow decline of many rebel groups see Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010).
  34. Similar metrics have been used by scholars to measure movement status. See Krause (see note 5), 72–116.
  35. James Mahoney, “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research,” *World Politics* 62, no. 1 (2010): 120–47; Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
  36. George and Bennett (see note 26), 73–123; Jack Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” *Conflict Management and Peace Studies* 25, no. 1 (February 2008): 1–18.
  37. Thad Dunning, *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
  38. Virginia Paige Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes,” *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 519–56; Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” *International Security* 31, no. 2 (2006): 311–42.
  39. Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 1; Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 4–6. The Brotherhood has affiliates in several other countries including Syria, Jordan, and Kuwait.
  40. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 21–23.
  41. Islamists believe there should be no distinction between religious law and secular government. See Christina DeGregorio, “Islamism in Politics: Integration and Persecution in Egypt,” *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 48, no. 2 (2010): 344.
  42. Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” *Foreign Policy* 86, no. 2 (2007): 107–121.
  43. Wickham (see note 40), 22.
  44. Anette Ranko and Justyna Nedza, “Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt’s Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 39, no. 6 (2016): 521.
  45. Wickham (see note 40), 27–28.
  46. The use of violence is not necessary to classify an organization as an insurgency. See Stephan and Chenoweth (see note 1), 7–44.
  47. DeGregorio (see note 41), 350–51.
  48. Wickham (see note 40), 28.
  49. The Muslim Brotherhood remained an illegal party during Sadat’s regime. Hesham Al-Awadi, *In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 79.
  50. IG is sometimes referred to by alternate names or spellings including Jamaat al-Islamiyya, Al-Jamaat, and Islamic Group.

51. Lisa Blaydes and Lawrence Rubin, "Ideological Reorientation and Counterterrorism: Confronting Militant Islam in Egypt," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 4 (2008): 464–65; J. A. Nedoroscik, "Extremist Groups in Egypt," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14, no. 2 (2002): 58.
52. DeGregorio (see note 41), 356–57.
53. Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power* (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 38–47.
54. United States Department of State, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2007/103714.htm>; Blaydes and Rubin (see note 51), 464–65.
55. DeGregorio (see note 41), 353–54.
56. Geneive Abdo, *No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 20–21.
57. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, "Global Terrorism Database," <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=357>.
58. Elie Podeh, "Egypt's Struggle Against the Militant Islamic Groups," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 8, no. 2 (1996): 43–61.
59. Blaydes and Rubin (see note 51), 467–68.
60. Anette Ranko, *The Muslim Brotherhood and Its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt: State Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse* (Weisbaden, Germany: Springer, 2015), 141–42.
61. Blaydes and Rubin (see note 51), 468–72.
62. Jérôme Drevon, "Assessing Islamist Armed Groups' De-Radicalization in Egypt," *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 27, no. 3 (2015): 296–303.
63. Ranko (see note 60), 141–42. On IG's membership size see National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), "Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya," <http://www.start.umd.edu/baad/narratives/al-gamaat-al-islamiyya-ig>.
64. Ranko (see note 60), 142–43.
65. Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political Change in Egypt* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 214–15.
66. Ranko (see note 60), 158.
67. Asal, Brown, and Dalton (see note 20), 98.
68. Gamini Samaranayake, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Prospects of Management: An Empirical Inquiry," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3, no. 2 (1991): 76–78; Kristine Höglund, "Violence and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka," *Civil Wars* 7, no. 2 (2005): 159–60.
69. Richards (see note 12), 10.
70. Manoj Joshi, "On the Razor's Edge: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 19, no. 1 (1995): 20.
71. W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto, "A War of Attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 19, no. 4 (2008): 577; Kristian Stokke, "Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-controlled Areas of Sri Lanka," *Third World Quarterly* 27, no. 6 (2006): 1022.
72. Gamini Samaranayake, "Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 9, no. 2 (1997): 115.
73. Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 83.
74. Jannie Lilja and Lisa Hultman, "Intraethnic Dominance and Control: Violence against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War," *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 194.
75. Christina S. Furtado, "Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition. The Case of South Asia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007), 79.
76. Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 24.
77. Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 53; Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC),

- “Mapping Militant Groups,” <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/499>.
78. Kenneth D. Bush, *The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read Between the Lines* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 123.
  79. Lilja and Hultman (see note 74), 193–95.
  80. Richards (see note 12), 14–16.
  81. Raj K. Metha, *Lost Victory: The Rise and Fall of LTTE Supremo, V. Prabhakaran* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), 52.
  82. Richards (see note 12), 15.
  83. Samaranayake (see note 68), 82–83.
  84. Richards (see note 12), 14–15.
  85. After abandoning Tamil separatism, the PLOTE aligned with the government in its fight against the LTTE.
  86. Bloom (see note 77), 58–60; Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 51; Kenneth Bush (see note 78), 3.
  87. Because the PNV sought autonomy, its goals were different from ETA’s. For this reason, the PNV was not strictly speaking an insurgent organization.
  88. José Maria Portell, *Los Hombres de ETA* (Barcelona, Spain: DOPESA, 1974), 172–73.
  89. Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952–1980* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 241–42.
  90. Pedro Ibarra Güell, *La Evolución Estratégica de ETA: De La “Guerra Revolucionaria” hasta Después de la Tregua* (San Sebastian, Spain: Kriselu, 1989), 69.
  91. Rogelio Alonso, “Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 695–96.
  92. Exact sizes of ETA-m and ETA-pm at the time of the division are difficult to ascertain; however, most assessments are that ETA had roughly 300 to 500 members at the time of the split and that ETA-pm took a slightly larger share of the original organization’s members. See Clark (note 89), 221; Giovanni Giacomucci, *ETA pm: El otro camino* (Tafalla, Spain: Txalaparta, 1997), 17–18.
  93. Fernando Reinares, “Exit from Terrorism: A Qualitative Empirical Study of Disengagement and Deradicalization among Members of ETA,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 5 (2011): 783.
  94. Francisco J. Llera, José M. Mata, and Cynthia L. Irvin, “ETA: From Secret Army to Social Movement—The Post-Franco Schism of the Basque Nationalist Movement,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 3 (1993): 117.
  95. *Ibid.*, 118.
  96. *Ibid.*, 120.
  97. Robert P. Clark, *Negotiating with ETA: Obstacles to Peace in the Basque Country, 1975–1988* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1990), 90–92.
  98. *Ibid.*, 98.
  99. *Ibid.*, 103–6.
  100. Fernando Reinares and Rogelio Alonso, “Confronting Ethnonationalist Terrorism in Spain: Political and Coercive Measures Against ETA,” in Robert J. Art and Louise Richardson, eds., *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2007), 121.
  101. Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, *ETA Contra el Estado: Las Estrategias del Terrorismo* (Barcelona, Spain: Kriterion Tusquets, 2001), 73–109.
  102. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Global Terrorism Database,” <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.
  103. *Ibid.*
  104. Llera, Mata, and Irvin (see note 94), 127.
  105. Reinares and Alonso (see note 100), 109.

106. Although HB won seats in the Basque Parliament and the Spanish Parliament, its members boycotted proceedings as a form of protest.
107. Llera, Mata, and Irvin (see note 94), 111.
108. For more on expanding case studies into broader theory see George and Bennett (see note 26), 111–12.
109. For more identifying causal mechanisms see Andrew Bennet and Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015).